


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International Narcotics

STAFF NOTES

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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS

8 June 1977

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This publication is prepared by analysts in the Directorate of Intelligence for specialists in the Washington community who are interested in international narcotics matters. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

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USSR: Poppy Cultivation in the Lake Issyk-Kul Region

The Soviet Union probably ranks third, behind India and Turkey, in legal opium poppy cultivation, but relatively little information is available on the precise location and extent of its poppy fields or the agricultural techniques employed in their development. The Kirgiz Republic, in Soviet Central Asia, accounted for about 35 percent of the total Soviet opium production in 1973.

Opium poppy cultivation is concentrated in the eastern part of Kirgizia in the Lake Issyk-Kul region, high in the Central Tien Shan Mountains. A growing season of 140-150 days and the light chestnut soils characteristic of the region are especially favorable to the opium poppy, a traditional crop of the area. Under the direction of the Ministry of Medical Industry (Lekrasprom)



Harvesting opium near Lake Issyk-Kul. The last year that opium was extracted from poppy capsules in the Soviet Union was 1974. Since then the poppy straw method has been used.

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and its All-Union Office for the Production, Preparation, and Processing of Medicinal Plants, specialized farms are tasked with the development and cultivation of superior varieties of poppies.

Przheval'sk, a city of 50,000 at the eastern end of the lake, is the center of the Issyk-Kul poppy-growing region. Lekrasprom's All-Union Medicinal Plant Research Institute maintains a large experimental station on the outskirts of the town. This facility and others like it are responsible for research in biochemistry, seed selection, and methods of opium processing. The three principal varieties of opium poppies grown in the Soviet Union in 1970 were developed at this station--Przheval'sk-222 (early-ripening), Przheval'sk-D250 (middle-ripening), Przheval'sk-133 (late-ripening). Almost 1,000 varieties are grown and studied. In addition, research is conducted on the application of organic and chemical fertilizers and on improved harvesting techniques. Primary seed from the plants propagated at the station is distributed to farms in the area. The Przheval'sk station also conducts research on oil poppies, which are grown in the Russian, Ukrainian, and Moldavian republics.

A description of the Przheval'sk experimental station is included in a 1970 Soviet tourist guidebook

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Most of the Kirgiz opium poppies are grown on irrigated farm land on the northeast and southeast shores of the lake. These areas are characterized by small villages strung out along the main highway at 3- to 5-kilometer intervals, with poppy fields flanking both sides of the road.

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GOLDEN TRIANGLE: Narcotics Prices Remain Depressed
in Most Areas

Wholesale prices for narcotics in the Golden Triangle remained depressed through the end of April 1977. The average price for most narcotics was running significantly below the level of the same period in 1976. The most drastic reductions have taken place in the northern Shan State of Burma where the price of raw opium was some 60 percent below the 1976 level. Similar price reductions have also been reported in the Burma/Thailand border area for all types of narcotics.

An exception to the price reductions has been noted on sales in Bangkok and in the southern Thailand border area with Malaysia. In Bangkok, for example, pitzu (impure morphine base), morphine base, pai lung chu, and No. 4 heroin were selling at prices ranging from 4 to 21 percent above the same period of 1976. Number 4 heroin was also selling at 16 percent above the 1976 level in the southern Thailand border area.

Depressed prices in the producing and trading areas of the Golden Triangle continue to reflect a lack of market activity which has failed to draw down the large stocks of narcotics reported to be stored in the area. These stocks have recently been augmented by the 1977 harvest. On the other hand the higher prices that have been cited in Bangkok and southern Thailand probably result from increased activities of international traffickers in these markets.

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PAKISTAN: Government Faces Problems in Collecting
Opium

The Pakistani government is having difficulty buying opium in one district in the North-West Frontier Province because of the great difference between the prices paid by the government and illicit purchasers. In theory--but hardly in practice--all licit opium in Pakistan is produced under license and then sold to the government for processing and resale to registered addicts or pharmaceutical manufacturers.

According to the poppy growers in this district, they are not selling because they fear violence will break out at government purchasing centers in the unsettled political situation. Government officials believe the reason for their refusal to sell is the low government price--about \$20 per kilogram; the illicit price is about \$130 per kilogram.

If it wishes, the government could take action against the growers by not renewing their licenses. In such cases the growers usually obtain new licenses under assumed names or the names of relatives or become unlicensed growers. Almost half of those currently growing poppies in this district have no licenses. A more drastic step would be to ban all opium production in the district. This tactic has been used in the past, resulting in high level political intervention to remove the ban.

Even if the growers were willing to sell to the government, a significant amount of opium would still enter illicit channels. The government normally buys about four tons of opium in this district where total production is between 16 and 24 tons. In the province as a whole, poppy acreage this year is about 80 percent higher than the government ceiling.

The government expects to be able to buy opium in other parts of the province, and the government alkaloid factory is using previously confiscated opium obtained

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from the police. This approach will enable the government to meet its own needs, but will do nothing about the diversion of the opium produced in this one district.



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PAKISTAN: Current Embassy Assessment

The US embassy, in its most recent assessment of the narcotics situation in Pakistan, asserts that opium grown in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area could become a very serious problem for the US within three to five years, if the Mexican supply line is cut and international traffickers have to look for alternate sources of supply.

If efforts to eradicate production in Mexico are successful, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border area and the Golden Triangle would be the main potential sources of supply. The embassy believes the eradication of production is likely in neither area, but that it would be far easier to control shipments along the limited number of routes from the Golden Triangle than along the almost limitless routes open to the Pakistanis and Afghans.

The embassy notes that there is little factual basis for any estimate of Pakistani opium production but, emphasizing that its "guesstimate" is uncertain, puts production at 200 to 250 tons a year. The embassy estimates, again from limited information, that 55 to 65 percent of this opium is consumed in Pakistan, 35 to 40 percent in Iran, and possibly 5 percent in other countries.

Currently, most illicit opium in Pakistan is taken into the tribal areas and then shipped to other parts of Pakistan or through Afghanistan to Iran. Neither Afghanistan nor Pakistan has any effective control along the border, and the Afghans are able to do little to impede shipments within Afghanistan.

Within Pakistan, most opium is transported by truck along the main supply route where the large number of trucks engaged in legitimate commerce provides excellent cover for narcotics shipments. Some of this opium is then exported through Karachi to Iran and the United Arab Emirates. Opium also moves through Baluchistan Province to Iran, and from small ports in Baluchistan to Iran and the Persian Gulf.

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About a third of Pakistan's opium is produced in the tribal areas, and the embassy doubts that any Pakistani government is likely to make the effort required to establish enough central control there to deal with production. The embassy would be very surprised if the government is able to enforce a ban on production in the more settled areas within the next five years. If the Pakistanis go forward with present programs, poppy-growing might be eliminated in irrigated areas and main valleys in that period. About half the crop, however, is grown in mountainous areas where production might well increase as it declines in more accessible places.

Senior Pakistani officials are committed to a narcotics control program, and no one in the government openly opposes such a program, but implementation is slow. The Prime Minister--who recently managed to get a politically important constitutional amendment ratified in a single day--has allowed a comprehensive narcotics control bill to languish for more than two years. Some high officials resent narcotics control efforts, which they view as forcing Pakistan to use its scarce resources to help solve the problems of much wealthier countries. The embassy reports a distinct lack of enthusiasm for narcotics control in the government and a vast number of officials who are completely uninterested in the problem.

Moreover, there are strong indications of high level protection for the hashish traffic, and the embassy has little doubt that there would be similar high level attempts to protect opium production if necessary.

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COLOMBIA: Discovery of Large Marijuana Fields

Reports of the "world's largest" marijuana field in the Guajira region of northeast Colombia have focused official and public attention on the extent and sophistication of cannabis production in the country. Originally reported as 1,500 hectares, the marijuana fields, which are interspersed among other agricultural crops, are now estimated at 200-250 hectares.

Even with this lower estimate, the sector under cultivation is still extensive. Moreover, the report that some 300 farm workers were recruited from neighboring areas to tend the fields, coupled with the discovery of irrigation facilities and modern agricultural implements, is an indication of the commercial and highly professional aspect of the marijuana business in Colombia.


Colombia has long been a principal source of marijuana supply for the US market. Most of it is grown in the rugged Sierra Nevada Mountains in the departments of Magdalena and Cesar. The Guajira, perhaps more infamous as a center for contraband smuggling, also has a reputation for marijuana cultivation.

There are no estimates on the amount of marijuana grown in Colombia, but US Drug Enforcement Administration officials believe that 50 to 80-ton shipments of the drug are routine and that smaller 1 to 2-ton shipments may leave the country several times a day. Most of the marijuana is stored clandestinely on commercial or private vessels which depart from Riohacha, Santa Marta, Barranquilla, Cartagena, or other Caribbean seaport cities. In addition, innumerable secret runways facilitate air smuggling. Virtually all of the Colombian marijuana is destined for the US market, entering through the east coast, Florida, and the Gulf of Mexico.

The latest discovery in the Guajira generated a spate of news articles in Colombia calling for tighter narcotics controls. According to the executive secretary

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of the National Council on Dangerous Drugs (NCDD), herbicides which had been considered for eradication of the marijuana field will not be used because of legal and political constraints and because the marijuana is interspersed with legitimate crops. Reportedly, some Colombian government agencies are looking into the possibilities of crop substitution and the development of industry in the Guajira as approaches to future marijuana control.

In the interim, the military is apparently becoming involved in anti-marijuana operations in the area. Similar in design to the Mexican military's "Operation Condor," the Colombian armed forces now are reportedly conducting patrols to locate additional marijuana fields and manning road blocks and patrolling the coast to prevent the shipment of harvested plants.

Considering the state of near anarchy in the volatile Guajira region, the military's participation will be essential for even a modestly successful operation against the marijuana growers and traffickers. Colombia's military establishment, however, dislikes police roles and may not be a willing participant in any government effort directed against marijuana producers. Furthermore, given the feeling of futility in Colombia regarding the overall narcotics trafficking problem, it is unlikely that enforcement officials will be inclined to do much about the innocuously regarded marijuana issue.

The narcotics situation in Colombia could become a minor campaign issue in next year's presidential elections, but the state of the economy and unemployment will predominate. Even if government and enforcement officials were to respond positively to US initiatives regarding marijuana control in Colombia, problems and misunderstandings no doubt would develop over what Bogota doubtlessly sees as an inconsistency between the US domestic policy of decriminalization for marijuana, and US efforts to convince foreign producers that marijuana is a dangerous drug.

Regardless of its political ramifications, marijuana production remains a profitable endeavor for Colombians. Faced with increasing economic hardships, more and more campesinos are likely to sow the lucrative marijuana seed. There have already been reports that small-scale Sierra

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Nevada coffee growers, who claim the National Federation of Colombian Coffee Growers (FNC) is not passing on the unprecedented profits from the current high prices, are switching to marijuana cultivation.

According to a news interview with a Colombian farmer, the cultivation of marijuana does not require the costly chemical agents needed to prevent coffee plant diseases. Furthermore, marijuana matures in six months while coffee takes three years to reach maturity. In the Sierra Nevada, marijuana brings 30,000 pesos (\$820) per quintal or 100 kilograms. On the other hand, 125 kilograms of coffee, which constitutes a "load," is worth only 7,300 pesos (\$200) in the Sierra, and there are innumerable difficulties involved in transporting it to the regional centers where the FNC is located.



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IRAN: New Narcotics Control Organization*

Tehran has recently taken steps to strengthen its drug control program, the most significant action being the establishment in early May of a government agency whose sole mission is to monitor Iran's enforcement procedures. The Iranians, moreover, are showing greater interest in regional cooperative efforts to control drugs. These positive Iranian initiatives are, in part, in response to advice and encouragement from local US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) representatives.

While the national police have had an active anti-narcotics program for the past 20 years, intergovernmental cooperation with other law enforcement agencies has been virtually nonexistent. The establishment of the new agency should help to strengthen coordination among the government agencies--police, gendarmerie, and customs--that are responsible for the enforcement of Iran's drug control laws. The head of the new organization, Behruz Shahandeh, is regarded by DEA field representatives as a qualified professional.

Initially, at least, the new agency's charter calls for a cooperative--not a control--relationship with the other enforcement agencies. The drug agency will have its own inspectors, however, giving agency chief Shahandeh the capability to assess the results of seizures independently of police reports.

The police and the gendarmerie are giving narcotics enforcement a higher priority as demonstrated by the allocation of greater manpower resources to drug control assignments. Both agencies have established additional special narcotics units, and the police have expanded their number of drug control personnel by 35 percent in Tehran and the provinces.

*See Brief, p. 17
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Iranian authorities appear to be increasingly aware of the merits of pooling regional assets in coming to grips with the nation's inordinately large drug addiction problem. Nearly all of the illegal opium smuggled out of neighboring Pakistan and Afghanistan is destined for Iran where it is consumed by addicts who are not registered and serviced by the government.

Shahandeh told the local DEA representative that Iran is becoming concerned about the increased poppy production in Afghanistan and has mentioned the problem to the Afghans. He said that Tehran is considering linking its economic aid to Afghanistan to Kabul's willingness to limit poppy production. He stressed that Tehran is willing to help Afghanistan strengthen its narcotics control program by providing training in Iran for drug enforcement specialists assigned to the Afghan police and gendarmerie.

The new Iranian drug chief did not indicate how the Afghans responded to Tehran's inquiries on their shared narcotics problems. Even if Kabul is willing to cooperate with Tehran's proposal for regional cooperation, however, it will be hampered by its limited capability to police remote areas where some of the poppies are grown.

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NOTEWORTHY POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS

(Editor's Note: This item, with the exception of the introduction, was produced for another CIA publication and does not deal specifically with the international narcotics situation. It is included here because it concerns a developing political situation that could impact adversely on the international narcotics control effort.)

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TURKEY: Election Results

Opium poppy controls and related matters were not in great evidence during Turkey's recently completed parliamentary election campaign. There seems to be a tacit consensus among politicians, technicians, and farmers that the control program works better than the old system and that, while it may need some tinkering, it should not be abandoned.

National Salvation Party leader Necmettin Erbakan--who has held the balance of power in two recent coalition governments--tried to woo rural voters at one point in the campaign with promises of expanding poppy cultivation to two eastern provinces where the crop is now banned, but he presumably meant under the current controls. If Erbakan ends up with a role in the government again, he may be expected to push this line.

There were no decisive winners in Sunday's parliamentary election in Turkey, and the country seems to be in for another period of relatively weak caretaker and coalition governments. Complete unofficial returns give opposition leader Ecevit's center-left Republican Peoples Party a comfortable parliamentary plurality. His party gained 28 seats and will apparently fall 13 seats short of the 226 needed for a parliamentary majority.

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Ecevit will spare no effort to attract enough independents, defectors from other parties, and splinter-party deputies to form a working majority. The realities of parliamentary arithmetic, however, will probably require him to turn once again to the right-wing, Islamic-revivalist National Salvation Party.

As they proved in their eight-month coalition in 1974, Ecevit and Salvationist leader Erbakan are unlikely partners in both temperament and ideology. Each, however, seems capable of making the necessary adjustments and concessions for the sake of gaining power.

Negotiations between the two will be difficult and may be protracted as well. Ecevit--having come so close to winning outright--will jealously protect his prerogatives, while Erbakan, although his party's parliamentary strength is down, will still be in a position to sell his votes to the highest bidder. Erbakan could switch to Justice Party leader Demirel if Ecevit's terms appear unsatisfactory.

Another Ecevit-Erbakan coalition would have no assurance of longevity. Both men would strive to make any coalition protocol as specific as possible in order to minimize the bickering that was a major factor in the demise of their earlier partnership. Erbakan might be slightly less feisty than before, but dissension and indecision would probably prevail.

If Ecevit is unsuccessful in forming a government, Demirel will try. Demirel's Justice Party scored dramatic gains over 1973; as an aggregate, the four center-right parties of his current government now hold an absolute majority. There would be considerable reluctance in all parties--particularly Erbakan's--to recreate the stresses of the former coalition, but the lure of power would probably win out.

There may be talk in the coming days of alternatives to government by coalition--a minority government or a "grand coalition" of Ecevit's and Demirel's parties. The principal party leaders will probably give serious consideration to them, however, only if other options prove unworkable.

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NATIONAL ASSESSMENTS

COCAINE COUNTRIES

Overview: Virtually all of the cocaine that enters the US originates in Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, or Colombia--the countries that compose the coca leaf-growing and processing region of South America. Each of these countries shares similar characteristics which facilitate the growth of cocaine trafficking and impede indigenous narcotics control efforts. For example, long and socially accepted traditions of smuggling, corruption among government officials and law enforcement agencies, and extensive, unpatrolled borders provide an ideal setting for cocaine trafficking. Lack of resources, equipment, and trained personnel, plus unsophisticated and frequently uncoordinated enforcement efforts, weak judicial systems, and poor cooperation among governments in the region further impede efforts to combat the problem.

PERU


Significance: Peru is a major producer of coca and the main source of illicit cocaine. Statistics on both licit coca and illegal cocaine production, however, are imprecise. The US embassy estimates that 70 percent or more of the world's coca leaf supply comes from Peru. Annual crop production, which is "regulated" by the National Coca Company, is thought to be somewhere between 14 and 22 million kilograms. Of this amount, perhaps one half to two thirds is diverted to the illicit drug market. Campesinos, who usually know nothing of the drug trade, readily sell their crops to traffickers whose prices exceed what can be earned on the legal, commercial market. Since it is primarily a growing or production area, the majority of Peruvian traffickers serve as wholesalers who provide either raw leaves or partially refined coca paste to a variety of local and "international customers." By employing an endless variety of imaginative smuggling routes and techniques, traffickers are able to transport the paste to its final refinement site either in Peru or to one of several other intermediate countries where it is converted to finished cocaine, packaged, and shipped to distributors in the US and Europe.

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Principal Areas of Coca Cultivation



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Problem: Although Peru ratified the United Nations Convention on Drugs in 1964, which in Peru's case stipulated a cutback in coca production within a 25-year period, there has been a general lack of interest in the coca issue within the military government. Indeed, in the past ten years coca production instead of tapering off has increased more than two-fold and continues to expand at a rate of more than 10 percent annually. Many officials believe that crop reduction would precipitate increased migrations to the country's already overcrowded capital city. As a result, they favor continued and even increased production because it permits the Indians to support themselves without subsidy from the financially troubled central government. Moreover, most government officials believe that it is futile to attempt to reduce or eliminate the crop because use of the plant is ingrained in the cultural and economic life of Peru's 6 million Quechua Indians. Furthermore, many government officials maintain that cocaine trafficking is a problem of police control and that it is essentially an issue for the US to resolve since the drug is used almost exclusively by North Americans. In the midst of this indecisiveness, cocaine trafficking organizations have proliferated to a point where there are now thousands of efficient systematic trafficking networks.

Prospects: The continuing efforts of moderate and radical military officers to solidify their political positions and to influence the revolution's future direction, coupled with pressing demands to solve the country's social and economic problems, more than likely will deter the development of a clear policy on Peru's coca situation. Certain factors, however, have forced the government to take a more serious, and perhaps sustained, look at the narcotics issue. The discovery last year that an urban terrorist gang was financing its operations from the proceeds of cocaine trafficking prompted the attorney general, with the apparent backing of President Morales Bermudez, to call for crop substitution, public education programs on drugs, and increased enforcement measures against traffickers. Geographic factors, however, will continue to make control of the illicit activity difficult.

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
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so, based on past experience, the Peruvians may well

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Major Cocaine Producing Areas



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have called for anti-narcotics measures enthusiastically only to allow their interest and efforts to be diverted at some future point. There has even been speculation that the junta welcomed the terrorist/trafficker connection, and perhaps even magnified it, to justify a prolongation of the state of siege and an intensification of certain repressive tactics. Peru may now be experiencing a national sense of responsibility for being the world's principal source of illicit cocaine, but the military government has still not become sufficiently involved to confront effectively a problem that only it can solve. Despite the fact that US-Peruvian relations are improving and that US influence on drug control is increasing, the military government will continue to make policy decisions on the basis of what it perceives to be domestic imperatives. More than likely, narcotics control will continue to be of secondary interest. [REDACTED]

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BOLIVIA

Significance: As a producer of both coca and cocaine, Bolivia is of major importance to the US narcotics control effort. Second only to Peru in volume of production, Bolivia is pumping increasing amounts of cocaine into the multi-country pipeline, which extends north through Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, and south to Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. Figures on the amount of cocaine produced in Bolivia each year vary significantly. The head of the Departamento de Narcoticos y Substancias Peligrosas (DNSP), the principal agency charged with narcotics control in Bolivia, estimated in 1976 that 17 tons annually were illegally exported. [REDACTED]

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Problem: Like Peru, the production and consumption of coca have been in integral part of the cultural life of highland Bolivia since pre-Inca times. In recent years, Bolivian coca production has increased but indigenous consumption (mastication) of the coca leaf itself has declined. Apart from the thousands of small farmers and Indians who are culturally and financially dependent on the plant, large-scale production and cultivation are being undertaken by groups who cater exclusively to the extensive and rapidly expanding illicit cocaine market.

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As new roadways are constructed in Bolivia, more areas for coca cultivation are opened and the potential for expansion of illicit trafficking increases. The Yungas and Chapare regions already are leading areas of production. The province of Santa Cruz, referred to by many as the "cocaine capital of the world," deserves special mention.

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Prospects: In deciding last year to implement an intensive narcotics control program in Bolivia, Banzer demonstrated a willingness to take a firmer stance. With large-scale financial assistance from the US, pilot study programs have been undertaken to determine a feasible crop substitute for the coca plant, and indigenous enforcement programs are being improved. A host of serious problems, however, will continue to impede effective narcotics control in Bolivia. Historically, Bolivia has lacked a strong central government, a factor which immediately limits the effectiveness of crop substitution

Neither the number of acres of coca cultivation nor their location is known, and aerial surveillance methods have not yet been developed. Unlike Mexico and Turkey, helicopters cannot be used effectively in Bolivia for eradication programs because of the extreme altitudes involved.

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BRIEFS

ECUADOR: The price of one kilogram of cocaine paste in Guayaquil last month was between \$1,600-\$1,800, while the price of one kilogram of cocaine sulfate or base was approximately \$7,200. Refined cocaine hydrochloride was valued at \$10,000. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the prices for the paste and sulfate represent the wholesale price for sales to Ecuadorean chemists. Sales to Colombians who carry the raw materials across the border to their own laboratories are considered retail business and prices are higher. Based on statistics available in the Guayaquil DEA office, over the past seven months the prices of paste and sulfate have increased \$400 and \$2,000 respectively. The price rise, however, has not resulted from a shortage of raw materials coming from Peru but from an increased demand for both paste and sulfate. As a result of the demand, Ecuadorean laboratory operators are able to sell cocaine sulfate rather than fully refined cocaine hydrochloride and still earn sizable profits. [REDACTED]

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WEST GERMANY: Dr. Huebner, assistant head of the South and Southeast Asian Office in the West German Foreign Office, agreed on June 2 to propose a West German demarche to Kabul aimed at promoting tighter government control over opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. (C)

THAILAND: Prime Minister Thanin Kraiwichian in a recent press interview claimed that heroin traffickers are now using floating laboratories in the Andaman Sea, part of the Indian Ocean west of the Malay Peninsula, to process opium into morphine and heroin. The source of the Prime Minister's information is not known, [REDACTED]

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THAILAND: The Thai government has announced that a "huge operation" will be launched this year to encourage hill tribesmen to switch from opium poppy cultivation to the growing of coffee beans.

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Coffee is being promoted as a viable crop substitute for opium, and initial testing of the product in Geneva has found the coffee to be "very good to outstanding." UN officials believe it will be at least three more years before Thai coffee production will reach levels that will permit foreign export.



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INTERESTING READING

Illicit Drugs Transported by Mail (AUSTRALIA)--TNDD,
No. 302, June 1, 1977, pp.8-9.*

*Addicts Dying of Poisoned Heroin (AUSTRALIA)--TNDD, No.
302, pp. 15-16.*

*Rangoon Radio on Narcotics Suppression from 1975 to 1977
(BURMA)--TNDD, No. 302, pp. 18-19.*

*Malaysia Faces Serious Threat from Drugs (MALAYSIA)--
TNDD, No. 302, pp. 30-34.*

*Progress on Antidrug Campaign Reported (SINGAPORE)--TNDD,
No. 302, p. 54.*

*Drug Flow Down; France to Send Drug Aide (THAILAND)--
TNDD, No. 302, pp. 59-60.*

*Thai Doctor on Treating Drug Addicts, Addiction Figures
(THAILAND)--TNDD, No. 302, p. 71. ("...statistics
compiled by several institutions indicated that the
number of narcotics in the country is about 500,000,
about 300,000 of whom are youths.")*

*Seizure of "Mexican Brown" Heroin (THAILAND)--TNDD, No.
302, pp. 72-73. ("...the first 'Mexican Brown' type
of heroin ever seized in Thailand.")*

*Cabildo Discusses Spread of Addiction (MEXICO)--TNDD,
No. 302, pp. 91-92. (Dr. Hector Cabildo is president
of the Mexican Mental Health Society. He notes that
the drug addiction problem in Mexico is "growing
alarmingly" and that the percentage of those who
take drugs occasionally and then become addicted
has increased from 12 to 25.)*

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Charges Government Ignoring Plight of Addicts (GREECE) --
TNDD, No. 302. pp. 104-107.

Newsweek, "The Cocaine Scene," May 30, 1977; pp. 20-25.
A concise account of the history and extent of the
cocaine problem in the US.

Washington Post Potomac Magazine, "Cocaine of Washington,"
June 5, 1977; pp. 18-21. Describes the cocaine
atmosphere in Washington, D.C.

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